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Solidarity through National Pride: The Future of Catholic Politics in the 21st 
Century 
Abstract 
This paper raises the Pragmatist concepts of solidarity and national pride, as espoused by American 
philosophers such as John Dewey and Richard Rorty, as potential means for Catholics in Western 
democratic nations to approach the current political issues facing them in the 21st century. Though 
Dewey and Rorty were neither politicians nor Catholics (being liberal thinkers trained in philosophy), their 
views on solidarity and patriotism in modern liberal democracies provide useful roadmaps for Catholics in 
Europe and the Anglosphere to navigate our present period of polarised and highly partisan politics, 
potentially reaching a ‘sensible centre’ akin to the American Catholic political tradition since the 1930s. 
This centrism relies on this Pragmatist solidarity through a shared hope of a pluralistic society constantly 
improved upon for the benefit of future generations. Catholics can only achieve this solidarity and hope if 
they feel, in the spirit of Rorty, a deep sense of national pride for their country. This type of national pride 
is not reactionary in nature, but advocates a politics of pluralism rather than identity, democratic 
nationalism rather than amorphous internationalism, and active engagement in the public square to 
implement an achievable political programme of action which is hopeful and borne out of a collective 
imagination for a better future for their countries. 
This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: 
https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol8/iss2/1 
Solidarity through National Pride: Catholic Politics in the Age of Populism 
 
Christopher J. Dowson 
 
I. Introduction 
 
It is not difficult to make the case that the Catholic Church in Western democracies now faces 
a challenge, not solely of faith but also of politics. The ‘Catholic vote’ in the 2016 United 
States Presidential Election was almost evenly split between the internationalist liberal 
policies of Hillary Clinton and the nationalist-conservative ones of Donald Trump. Regardless 
of Pope Francis’ political obiter dicta,1 Catholics in America produced high levels of support 
for Trump (exit polling in fact showed that Trump won the Catholic vote 52% to 48%2), 
whose worldview appears largely opposed to the Pope’s, notably on contentious issues such 
as immigration.3 In Europe, in the 2018 national and 2019 European Parliamentary elections, 
Italian voters appeared to favour populist and anti-immigration platforms in large numbers, 
prompting media headlines warning of a rising ‘right wing nationalism’ across Europe and 
suggesting that the Catholic Church had ‘lost Italy to the far right’.4  
This paper seeks to address the question of how Catholics might approach politics in 
this current era of political populism and reactionary nationalism. I aim to focus primarily 
upon American philosopher Richard Rorty’s concepts of national pride and solidarity and 
hope and imagination and propose that these interconnected concepts offer potential antidotes 
for Catholics to the current political polarisation facing both the Church and Western 
democracies. Specifically, I will examine the first two concepts in the framework of three 
major civic issues currently facing Western democracies: multiculturalism, nationalism, and 
internationalism. 
 
II. Defining Solidarity  
 
It must be made clear ab initio what the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘national pride’ refer to in 
Rorty’s framework. Rorty does not directly link the two but, reading them in tandem, they 
provide a fruitful starting point for a political outlook that may be relevant to all Catholics, 
despite their geopolitical circumstances. Achieving Our Country is the seminal work in which 
Rorty makes the distinction between the pride of identity politics and ‘national pride’, the 
former identified with the post-1960s ‘cultural Left’ and the latter with the pre-1960’s Leftist 
tradition typified within social organisations such as trade unions and labour movements, 
 
1 See e.g. Phillip Pullella, “Pope says he would confront Trump directly on border wall”, Reuters, 29 May 2019 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-pope/pope-says-he-would-confront-trump-directly-on-
border-wall-idUSKCN1SY23S  
2 M. N. Schmaltz, “How the Support of Catholics Helped Donald Trump’s Victory”, Fortune, 9 November 2016, 
http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-election-2016-catholic-vote. 
3 See e.g. H. Sherwood, “Pope Francis appears to criticize Trump’s Mexico border wall plan”, The Guardian, 9 
February 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/pope-francis-walls-bridges-donald-trump, 
where Francis is reported to have said not to ‘[…] raise walls but bridges […] A Christian can never say: “I’ll 
make you pay for that.” Never! That is not a Christian gesture. An offense is overcome with forgiveness, by 
living in peace with everyone.’ 
4 See e.g. Mattia Ferrarsi, ‘How the Catholic Church Lost Italy to the Far Right’, New York Times, 4 July 2019 < 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/04/opinion/catholic-church-italy.html>; Editorial, “Make no mistake – right-
wing populism is making a resurgence in Europe, as the Italian elections show”, The Independent, 5 March 
2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/italy-election-results-populsim-resurgence-europe-anti-
eu-silvio-berlusconi-5-star-movement-luigi-di-a8240861.html; Bernd Riegert, “Italy's election results highlight a 
European trend”, Deutsche Welle, 6 March 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-italys-election-results-
highlight-a-european-trend/a-42841622.  
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occupied with concrete policy change in America’s institutions, as opposed to broader 
theories of oppression, victimisation and identity. Rorty argues that ‘taking pride in being 
black or gay is an entirely reasonable response to the sadistic humiliation to which one has 
been subjected’, yet if this same pride inhibits someone from also taking pride in being an 
American citizen, ‘from thinking of his or her country as capable of reform, or from being 
able to join with straights or whites in reformist initiatives, it is a political disaster’.5 Rorty 
describes the concept of ‘solidarity’ as the ability to see traditional differences such as tribe, 
religion or race as ‘unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and 
humiliation’.6 Contrary to the metaphysicians who pine for a meta-language that transcends 
individual group vocabularies and historical narratives - solidarity is achieved by taking 
account of the contingencies of our shared histories, places, and cultures with a view to 
reducing pain and cruelty through civic commonalities. Solidarity, Rorty argues, has to be 
constructed ‘out of little pieces, rather than found already waiting, in the form of an ur-
language which all of us recognize when we hear it’.7  
By fusing Rorty’s concepts of national pride and solidarity, one may assert the following 
propositions:  
 
1. We cannot feel solidarity with people of vastly different beliefs, cultures, nationalities 
etc., if we cannot first feel solidarity with our own fellow citizens;  
2. Identity politics and pride in one’s ‘group’ – whether defined by race, gender, 
sexuality or religion – is acceptable up until the point it precludes a feeling of pride for 
one’s nation, in which case it ought to be abandoned; and 
3. Without pride in one’s nation, there is no incentive to reform it, to improve it, to 
reduce pain and cruelty towards others, or to engage in the ongoing process of self-
creation with fellow citizens.  
 
Contrary to popular tropes describing nationalism as isolationist, ignorant of international 
issues, and self-absorbed, it is possible that by combining Rorty’s concepts of national pride 
and solidarity, an opposing praxis will result. If national pride is widespread, ‘solidarity’ (in 
the social sense of reducing pain and cruelty towards other human beings) will, to use a 
Rortyian phrase, ‘take care of itself’. 
 
III. Rorty’s Secularism and Catholics 
 
A preliminary question to address is how a secularist philosopher like Rorty can serve as a 
useful scion upon which Catholics might graft a cohesive and modern political worldview. 
Rorty was nominally a supporter of the American liberal Left and had little time for religion 
as part of his political philosophy, arguing for a culture of liberalism ‘which was enlightened, 
secular […] in which no trace of divinity remained’.8 Yet Catholics need not limit their 
intellectual sources of inspiration on issues such as politics, social policy, or national pride 
simply to Catholic intellectuals, indeed even Christian ones. The risk of doing so presents the 
problem of the intellectual ‘bubble’, one less capable of addressing broader socio-political 
concerns not directly pertaining to doctrinal matters. The Church has historically found much 
value in non-Christian philosophers, especially in its incipient years with St Thomas Aquinas 
and St Augustine of Hippo borrowing liberally from the authorities of non-Christians (Plato 
and Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca, among others). Further, the suggestion of an alternative 
 
5 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country (Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 1998), 100.  
6 Ibid, 192. 
7 Ibid., 94. 
8 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 45. 
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political programme of action to the Pope’s by the laity is not at all at odds with Catholic 
teaching. As St Pius X said of the separation between the teachings of the Church and the 
political duties of the citizen:  
 
Every Catholic, from the fact that he is also a citizen, has the right and the duty to 
work for the common good in the way he thinks best, without troubling himself about 
the authority of the Church, without paying any heed to its wishes, its counsels, its 
orders - nay, even in spite of its reprimands.9 
 
The Pragmatists themselves were historically neither hostile nor dismissive of religious 
‘truth’, as William James wrote: ‘[O]n pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works 
satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true.’10 Even accepting Rorty’s secularism 
on face value, such a description of his religiopolitical worldview is only superficial. As 
Boffetti observed, Rorty transitioned from a militant secularist early in his career to a 
‘romantic polytheist’ who often deployed religious tropes in support of his own ideal of a 
liberal democratic political community.11 In works such as Achieving Our Country, Boffetti 
noted that Rorty described a uniquely ‘American faith’ whose acolytes have included Walt 
Whitman, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Abraham Lincoln: ‘Sometimes Rorty calls this 
American faith a “religion of democracy” and at other times “romantic polytheism.”’12 In any 
case, that ‘being religious’ is a necessary antecedent for Catholics to glean insight from a 
philosopher is clearly a straitlaced approach to the development of political opinions and 
ought not militate against the arguments proposed in this paper.  
 
IV. Rory’s Pluralism and Francis’ Multiculturalism Compared 
 
In the article ‘The Unpatriotic Academy’ in 1994, Rorty admitted that, although ‘any Left is 
better than none’, there was a problem with the New Left - it was unpatriotic: ‘In the name of 
“the politics of difference,” it refuses to rejoice in the country it inhabits,’ he wrote. ‘It 
repudiates the idea of a national identity, and the emotion of national pride. This repudiation 
is the difference between traditional American pluralism and the new movement called 
multiculturalism’.13 Regarding this latter attitude, Pope Francis has frequently emphasised the 
need for such ‘multiculturalism’ as an intrinsic part of European identity. In a speech in 
Krakow on World Youth Day in 2016, Francis implored: ‘Today, we adults need you to teach 
us […] how to live in diversity, in dialogue, to experience multiculturalism not as a threat but 
an opportunity.’ In the Evangelii Gaudium [253], he implored Christians to ‘[…] embrace 
with affection and respect Muslim immigrants to our countries in the same way that we hope 
and ask to be received and respected in countries of Islamic tradition’. In a May 2016 speech, 
Francis went further and stated: ‘[I]t is not enough simply to settle individuals geographically: 
the challenge is that of a profound cultural integration’.14 He stated that current political 
activity needed to see the urgency of this integration: ‘[T]he roots of Europe, were 
consolidated down the centuries by the constant need to integrate in new syntheses the most 
varied and discrete cultures. The identity of Europe is, and always has been, a dynamic and 
 
9 St Pius X, “Pascendi Dominici Gregis” (Encyclical, Rome, 8 September, 1907), 24.   
10 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (London, 1907), 299.  
11 Jason. Boffetti, “How Richard Rorty Found Religion,” First Things 143 (May 2004), 24. 
12 Ibid, 25; see also ‘civic religion’ in Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 101.  
13 Richard Rorty, “The Unpatriotic Academy”, New York Times, 13 February 1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/13/opinion/the-unpatriotic-academy.html?mcubz=1  
14 Pope Francis, “Conferral of the Charlemagne Prize - Address of His Holiness Pope Francis” (Sala Regalia, 6 
May 2016).  
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multicultural identity.’15 Such a characterisation of European civilisation echoes the Hegelian 
trope of constant syntheses (of ideas, classes, identities or cultures etc.), brought about by 
oppositions with the ‘Other’.16 Rorty made the point that: ‘The Hegelian hope is that the 
result of such struggles will be a new culture, better than any of those of which it is the 
synthesis’.17 Yet unless one interprets Francis’ use of the terms ‘multiculturalism’ and 
‘integration’ as synonymic with ‘pluralism’, I think this approach needs readjustment. 
In Contingency, Rorty goes to great lengths to use ‘solidarity’ as a real-world 
phenomenon (as distinct from theological or philosophic foundations), which encompasses 
the shared mutual obligations of a community of ‘liberals’ in the West. Its aim is to reduce 
cruelty and pain and to enlarge the ethnos to include more individuals who support their 
country and have a shared goal of liberalism and moral progress. Rorty’s civic nationalism is 
not ethnocentric but liberal-centric; it is limited to the ethnos that contains liberal-minded 
communities who believe in moral progress, as opposed to an international multiculturalism: 
‘What takes the curse off this ethnocentrism is not that the largest such group is “humanity” 
or “all rational beings” […] but, rather, that it is the ethnocentrism of a “we” (“we liberals”) 
which is dedicated to enlarging itself, to creating an ever larger and more variegated ethnos’.18  
Rorty elsewhere argues the ‘romance of endless diversity’ ought not to be confused with what 
is called ‘multiculturalism’, which he defines as: ‘A politics of side-by-side development in 
which members of distinct cultures preserve and protect their own culture against the 
incursion of other cultures’.19 In The Demonization of Multiculturalism, Rorty proposes that: 
‘[I]t is not to the advantage either of our country or of those whom it still treats as second-
class citizens to urge, as the multiculturalists do, that we think of the United States as “a salad 
rather than a melting pot”’.20 From Francis’ comments above, I want to suggest that it is 
possible to read some of the Pope’s past comments on multiculturalism as being consonant 
with Rorty’s desire for an integrated, pluralistic societal structure – but this is not without 
some caveats. 
 In a May 2016 speech, Francis warned against those in Europe who are tempted by 
‘selfish interests’ and who consider ‘putting up fences here and there’, in an oblique reference 
to the exclusion of illegal immigrants arriving in southern Europe. Francis asserted: ‘The 
identity of Europe is, and always has been, a […] multicultural identity’.21 That the continent 
of Europe historically consisted of different cultures is a truism, but the context of this phrase 
appears to be broader, alluding to the problems associated with mass migration from non-
European regions, particularly controversial issues in Europe and the Anglosphere today. 
Francis approached this same subject in another way in his Address to the Council of Europe 
in 2014: 
 
[T]oday […] we can legitimately speak of a “multipolar” Europe. Its tensions – 
whether constructive or divisive – are situated between multiple cultural, religious 
and political poles. Europe today confronts the challenge of “globalizing”, but in a 
creative way, this multipolarity. Nor are cultures necessarily identified with individual 
 
15 Ibid.  
16 E.g. see Georg W.F. Hegel, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Chapter 22: ‘Der Herr ist das für sich 
seiende Bewußtsein, aber nicht mehr nur der Begriff desselben, sondern für sich seiendes Bewußtsein, welches 
durch ein anderes Bewußtsein mit sich vermittelt ist, nämlich durch ein solches, zu dessen Wesen es gehört, daß 
es mit selbstständigem Sein oder der Dingheit überhaupt synthesiert ist.’ 
17 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 25. 
18 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 198.  
19 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 24. 
20 Richard Rorty, “The Demonization of Multiculturalism,” Journal of Blacks in Higher Education 7 (1995): 74.  
21 Pope Francis, “Conferral of the Charlemagne Prize - Address of His Holiness Pope Francis” (Sala Regalia, 6 
May 2016), emphasis added.  
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countries: some countries have a variety of cultures and some cultures are expressed in 
a variety of countries. The same holds true for political, religious, and social 
aggregations. Creatively globalizing multipolarity, and I wish to stress this creativity, 
calls for striving to create a constructive harmony, one free of those pretensions to 
power which, while appearing from a pragmatic standpoint to make things easier, end 
up destroying the cultural and religious distinctiveness of peoples […] Today Europe 
is multipolar in its relationships and its intentions; it is impossible to imagine or to 
build Europe without fully taking into account this multipolar reality.22 
 
The use of the term ‘multipolar’ amounts to the same outcome as using ‘multicultural’ and, 
read with the cautions against ‘destroying the cultural and religious distinctiveness of 
peoples’ could easily invoke images of European nations as ‘salad bowls’, not melting pots 
(to apply Rorty’s metaphor). Certainly the ‘creative multiploarity’ Francis speaks of appears 
to be at odds with Rorty’s vision of a pluralistic society with a singular and common national 
pride in its country. Further, it is unclear from his speech whether Francis makes the 
distinction between cultural distinctiveness in private as opposed to public distinctiveness. 
The latter brings with it a plethora of issues, contentious ones to be sure, which affect the 
civic life of a nation and would certainly run counter to the Rortyian notion of ‘pluralism’, 
which he defined as ‘in your private life, in your religious life, in your spiritual life, be free to 
be as distinctive […] as you want to be. When it comes to public affairs, your culture, your 
individual ideals of perfection, your religion, should be irrelevant.’23 Francis’ statement that a 
constructive harmony in European societies is required, free from ‘pretensions to power’ 
which can destroy ‘the cultural and religious distinctiveness of peoples’ is also ambiguous as 
regards immigration and multiculturalism in 21st-century Europe, but it is possible to argue, 
along Rorty’s lines, that in the public (civic) sense, such cultural difference and distinction 
should be deemed irrelevant. Public policy ought not be made on the basis of a group’s 
religious beliefs or ethnic status, for example, but for the best interests of the public as whole. 
A globalised Europe with multiple cultures living side by side, often with different aims, 
beliefs, goals and imaginations, is politically unwieldy. Should a government favour one 
cultural group’s set of values over another’s? If so, on which bases?  In this sense, Francis’ 
‘multipolarity’ could lead to polarisation, since polarisation is an integral part of being 
multipolar (by definition).  
 
V. ‘National Pride’ and Solidarity 
 
A reshaping of Francis’ argument above, pari passu with the concept of Rorty’s ‘national 
pride’, would be along the lines of the following: European nations are and always have been 
‘multicultural’, but disparate cultures within each nation, though distinct in their private lives 
(worship, customs, beliefs, etc), ought to possess shared goals and hopes that might improve 
and reform their countries for the better (i.e. their civic life). A Chinese or Muslim citizen in 
France may have different hopes for France than a Chinese or Muslim citizen in Poland, for 
example. The fact these individuals share the same cultural and ethnic heritage should not 
preclude their active contribution to reforming and improving their respective societies based 
on their own unique socio-political circumstances and contingencies. This is not to repudiate 
Francis’ argument, merely to suggest a more effective pathway to ‘creative’ globalisation, as 
His Holiness termed it. If Chinese individuals in Poland or France actively seek to improve 
 
22 Pope Francis, “Address of Pope Francis to the Council of Europe” (Strasbourg, 25 November 2014), emphasis 
added.  
23 ‘Philosopher Richard Rorty.’ Forum, KQED Radio, 31 January, 2006, radio broadcast, 
https://www.kqed.org/forum/601311000/philosopher-richard-rorty.  
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their countries, in conjunction with their fellow citizens, with a shared goal about what Poland 
or France could look like 10 to 50 years from now, then I would argue that the potential for 
improvement across Europe in general greatly increases. A stronger, more harmonious and 
constantly improving Poland or France with fewer racial, ethnic, or sexual tensions, provides 
benefits to Europe, and the global community at large. Such an example highlights the 
interwoven connection between ‘national pride’ and ‘solidarity’.  
 Francis comes far closer to the political and social ‘solidarity’ that I have suggested 
above when he refers to French statesman and Biblical scholar Robert Schuman in his May 
2016 address: ‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be 
built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity’. Francis stressed, 
in relation to the Migrant Crisis facing Europe, that there was ‘a need to return to the same de 
facto solidarity and concrete generosity that followed the Second World War’. The use of 
‘solidarity’ here would seem to be in line with what Rorty and other Pragmatists would see as 
a beneficial approach to modern politics. 
 
VI. Hope Through Solidarity: Catholics and Democratic Liberalism 
 
In Achieving, Rorty provides a quote from historian Nelson Lichtenstein who said that 
America’s great reformist movements, from the abolitionist movements of the 19th century to 
the labour movements in the 1930s, ‘defined themselves as champions of moral and patriotic 
nationalism, which they counter-posed to the parochial and selfish elites which stood athwart 
their vision of a virtuous society’.24 The idea for Rorty was that the improvements in social 
conditions for Americans since the turn of the 20th century were embodied by a ‘hope’ within 
Leftist politics, hope in the form of a national pride. Rorty lamented that, with the rise of 
postmodern politics of identity within the universities after the Vietnam era, the New Left had 
become devoid of pride: ‘[A] nation cannot reform itself unless it takes pride in itself – unless 
it has an identity, rejoices in it, reflects upon it and tries to live up to it’.25 Such a view of 
solidarity through pride in one’s national identity (as opposed to an amorphous international 
‘multicultural identity’) ought to be adopted by Catholics in the West. The benefits of such an 
approach would translate into a political programme which could bring Catholics towards a 
majoritarian political position less susceptible to radical Left or Right ideologies, especially in 
the current era where such polarity is endemic within global politics.  
To adopt Lichtenstein’s sentiments above, the credit of the early leftist movements 
and their union counterparts were pluralistic and driven to action, united by a shared pride in 
their country rather than their disparate ethnic, religious, or sexual identities. American 
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr stressed the need for pluralism on multiple occasions, most 
vociferously against the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in Detroit during the 1920s. Niebuhr 
proclaimed: ‘We are admonished in Scripture to judge men by their fruits, not by their roots; 
and their fruits are their character, their deeds and accomplishments’.26 This approach 
removes the emphasis on identity politics in both the Left and Right, and instead underscores 
the shared motives citizens ought to be focused on to improve their countries, and to 
contribute to it in positive ways, rather than fracturing into various multicultural identities, 
pitting one against another and confusing the goals of a democratic society. 
What it means to live in a Western democracy is to envision democratic liberalism as 
an ‘ideal’, though far from perfect or objectively ‘right’, but nonetheless something for which 
to strive. As John Dewey wrote: ‘We have a preference for democracy in politics […] 
 
24 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 14.  
25 Richard Rorty. “The Unpatriotic Academy”. New York Times, 13 February 1994,  
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/13/opinion/the-unpatriotic-academy.html?mcubz=1. 
26 Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (New York, 1985), 91 (emphasis added).  
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Responsible government and publicity are our ideal, and upon the whole the ideal fares as 
well as most ideals in a rude and imperfect world’.27 It is on such a basis that Catholics would 
be better served politically by advocating for a shared national pride in their countries. This 
pride ought to be enthusiastic, but not of the kind Immanuel Kant warned: Schwärmerei, the 
fanatical boasting and blind cheering for one’s nation without admitting to its flaws or 
shortcomings.28 Instead, Catholics should not refrain from debate within the public square, 
and indeed should be impelled to action where there are serious social and economic 
challenges to be addressed. Behind all of these political efforts there must be something 
tangible for which to strive, lest it become an unanchored desire purely indifferent to the 
trajectory of the society in which one lives. In St John Paul II’s Sollicitudo rei Socialis, His 
Holiness made this declaration on the meaning of Catholic solidarity: 
 
[Solidarity] is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes 
of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering 
determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say, to the good of all 
and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.29 
 
One the one hand, St John Paul II’s description of solidarity echoes Rorty’s, and the latter 
sentences of the quotation above should be borne in mind when discussing solidarity through 
national pride. However, I would temper such a global definition of solidarity and instead 
assert that, while an awareness of injustices abroad ought never to be ignored, this should not 
first supersede an awareness of the injustices within one’s own country. If a society cannot 
address pain and cruelty in its own country and feel compassion for those less fortunate in its 
own communities, how can it hope to solve the myriad of injustices in other nations? To 
borrow from Edward R. Murrow during the Cold War: ‘[W]e cannot defend freedom abroad 
by deserting it at home’.30  
 
VII. Solidarity Through Introspection 
 
The internationalism that has been championed by the Vatican in the last few decades 
parallels the pivot of the Western cultural left and corporate capitalists towards globalisation, 
where foreign aid in record proportions has been donated from Europe and the Anglosphere 
into the global south and developing nations, where international travel is relatively 
inexpensive, and where the flow of capital between countries is lucrative, but which has led to 
the increasingly rapid collapse of local blue-collar industries. In an essay for the Business 
Ethics Quarterly 1998,31 Rorty quoted from an article by Edward Luttwack’s entitled “Why 
Fascism is the Wave of the Future” (1994). Luttwack had gone to the trouble of analysing the 
impact of globalism in America, characterised at the time by President Bill Clinton’s embrace 
of multilateral trade deals such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
 
27 John Dewey, “Our National Dilemma”, in Characters and Events, vol. 2, ed. J. Ratner (New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., 1929), 616-17.  
28 See the distinction between Schwärmerei (fanaticism) and Enthusiasmus (enthusiasm) in Immanuel Kant, P. 
Guyer (trans.) ‘Oberservations of the feeling of the beautiful and sublime’. In Anthropology, History, and 
Education. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007)), 58 where Kant uses ‘patriotic virtue’ as an example of Enthusiasmus.   
29 St John Paul II, “Sollicitudo rei Socialis” (Encyclical, Rome, 30 December, 1987), 38. 
30 Edward Murrow, “A Report on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,” See It Now, Screened 9 March 1954 (CBS, 
1954) Television Broadcast quoted in Joseph Wershba, “Murrow vs McCarthy: See It Now”, New York Times, 4 
March 1979, < https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/04/archives/murrow-vs-mccarthy-see-it-now.html> 
31 Richard Rorty. “Can American egalitarianism survive a globalized economy?” Business Ethics Quarterly, 
Supplemental Volume (1998): 1-6.  
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Luttwack noted that those working class Americans who had once earned decent wages in 
blue-collar jobs would no longer tolerate politicians who permitted a catastrophic fall in 
employment and in the standard of living. They would, according to Luttwack, ‘imitate the 
behaviour of the Germans at the end of the Weimar period. They would turn to populist 
rabble-rousers who would make empty promises, or else attempt to reinvigorate the economy 
by starting’, presumably referencing the rise of early 1990s populists such as Patrick 
Buchanan.32 Despite the eventual lack of such scenarios playing out in the 1990s or early 
2000s, both authors remain equally prescient today. Both foretold some form of unpredictable 
populism (for example Trumpism or Brexit) would be a likely consequence of unabated 
globalism and quasi-free trade. Rorty observed that the gap between rich and poor had been 
widening for twenty years, and noted a poll which suggested 57% of Americans thought that 
life would be worse for their children than for themselves. He asserted that, if the 
globalisation of the labour market accelerated at the predicted rate, vast areas of America 
would be reliant on the State for their welfare and large-scale income inequality would result:  
 
We know what happens when a middle class realises that its hopes have been 
betrayed, that the system no longer works, that political leaders no longer know how 
to shelter it from catastrophe. Middle class people look around for a scapegoat-
somebody to blame for a catastrophe that they themselves did nothing to deserve.33 
 
Despite the current nationalist fervour in the United States, the clear demand from voters on 
both sides of politics for clearer economic programmes tailored to the lower-middle classes 
could be seen as a sign of Catholic voters ‘introspecting’ again; that is, looking to the 
fundamental economic and social issues of their own communities before attempting to turn 
their minds to the myriad of similar or more grievous problems overseas. In the context of 
Francis’ political push for internationalism and multiculturalism, it is understandable why 
large groups of Catholics sympathised with Clinton’s worldview. Many Catholics have 
become partial to Francis’ political position and if European democracies held polls on 
whether they would prefer Trump or Clinton as their leader, many more European Catholics 
might have voted for the latter.34 Yet given Francis’ position on issues such as 
multiculturalism and immigration and his intense influence on many Catholics worldwide, 
what, if anything, can explain the high level of support for populist nationalist candidates in 
the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe?  
 
VIII. Catholic Voters and ‘Patriotic Virtue’  
 
This is explicable by first noting that the political locus of American Catholics has historically 
been within the political centre, with Catholic voters comprising a part of the valuable swing 
voting bloc which has decided the winner of every US Presidential election since 1972.35 I 
stress here the adjective ‘American’ because I do not think many of the patriotic or 
nationalistic tendencies within American Catholics are as widespread in European countries 
(excepting perhaps Italy in recent times), or even in other parts of the Anglosphere like 
Australia or Canada. One can trace the strengthening of American Catholic patriotism across 
historic waypoints such as the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the labour movements of 
 
32 Ibid., 2. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See e.g. v where surveys found all EU member states, except Hungary, preferred Clinton to Trump.  
35 E.g. see George E. Condon Jr., “Will Catholic Presidential candidates follow the Pope? Should they?” The 
Atlantic, 18 June 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/will-catholic-presidential-
candidates-follow-the-pope-should-they/442350. 
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the 1930s, and finally the rise of John F. Kennedy to the White House by the early 1960s. 
This is largely because an immense segment of the American trade union movement in the 
early 1900s was driven by Catholic beliefs of solidarity, social justice (in the Catholic sense), 
and fraternity.36 John McGreevy’s Catholicism and American Freedom, observes that it was 
the Catholic priests across the United States during the 1930s who were encouraging their 
parishioners to join labour unions, ‘some like Pittsburgh’s Charles Rice, Detroit’s Frederick 
Siedenberg, and Buffalo’s Monsignor John P. Boland, served on regional [labour] boards and 
played key roles in workplace negotiations’.37 These Catholics were not ashamed of their 
country, but nor were they uncritical of its political character.38 Instead, they were hopeful 
that if they each worked together towards a ‘New Deal’, then they could imagine and create 
an America that would be a better place for them, their families, and their children’s children. 
As Rorty argues, solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created: ‘It is created by 
increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, 
unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalize 
people different from ourselves.’39 This is the type of solidarity I take from the Rortyian 
characterisation of ‘national pride’ or the Kantian ‘patriotic virtue’. 
Reactionary politics is not novel to Catholics, especially working-class ones, in 
Western nations,40 though it is by no means a sustainable panacea to today’s pressing political 
issues. Yet without some nascent patriotic solidarity on the part of all American, German, 
Italian, British or Australian Catholics alike, I do not think the political course of these 
cultures’ respective nations can be lastingly altered. Isaiah Berlin argued against reactionary 
national pride on the basis that, in his view, such nationalism was:  
 
[…] [N]ationhood in a pathological state of inflammation: the result of wounds 
inflicted by someone or something on the natural feelings of society, or of artificial 
barriers to its normal development. This leads to the transformation of the notion of 
the individual’s moral autonomy into the notion of the moral autonomy of the nation, 
of the individual will into the national will to which individuals must submit, with 
which they must identify themselves, of which they must be the active, unquestioning, 
enthusiastic agents.41  
 
Such a characterisation of nationalism seems too simplistic and indeed the latter sentences of 
Berlin’s characterisation above can, and should, be construed as potentially positive 
consequences for citizens. It would instead be prudent to caution against a national pride that 
looks ‘inward’, uncoupled from the principle of solidarity, and certainly modern leftist 
philosophers such as Slavoj Žižek have made the contrast between ‘healthy’, as opposed to 
 
36 See inter alia David J. Saposs, “The Catholic Church and the Labor Movement” Modern Monthly vol. 7, 
(1933), 225: ‘The significant and predominant role of the Catholic Church in shaping the thought and aspirations 
of labor is a neglected chapter in the history of the American labor movement.’ 
37 John T. McGreevy, Catholicism and American Freedom (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 163.  
38 See for example just over a decade later during the Civil Rights era, the Catholic integrationist who strongly 
opposed Catholic segregationists, discussed in Mark Newman, Desegregating Dixie: The Catholic Church in the 
South and Desegregation, 1945-1992 (Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2018), Ch. 4.  
39 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xvi.  
40 Cf. n. 40 above Saposs (1933), 225: ‘The significant and predominant role of the Catholic Church in shaping 
the thought and aspirations of labor is a neglected chapter in the history of the American labor movement. Its 
influence explains, in part at least, why the labor movement in the United States differs from others, and why it 
has become more and more reactionary’ [emphasis added]. 
41 Isaiah Berlin, The Sense Of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their History, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1997), 247.  
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‘excessive’, nationalism.42 If national pride leads to isolationism and apathy for fellow human 
beings around the world, then the result is detrimental to a nation and to the global 
community in which that nation and its citizens interact. However, beyond its own political 
and legal institutions, to invoke a Kantian Reich der Zwecke, a democracy’s moral autonomy 
can only be derived from the morality of its individual citizens. Enthusiastic and active 
participation in that moral framework therefore breeds local, state, and national solidarity. 
Solidarity does not (and should not) need to derive from a single, negative source; for 
example, from perceived ‘wounds inflicted by someone or something’ (per Berlin), but 
simply from a shared dream that perhaps individual circumstances could one day be improved 
for future generations, a goal grounded in reducing pain and humiliation, incrementally, based 
on the contingencies of history and circumstance. As Rorty explains:  
 
The social glue holding together the ideal liberal society […] consists in little more 
than a consensus that the point of social organization is to let everybody have a chance 
at self creation to the best of his or her abilities […] This conviction would not be 
based on a view about universally shared human ends, human rights, the nature of 
rationality, the Good for Man, nor anything else. It would be a conviction based on 
nothing more profound than the historical facts which suggest that without the 
protection of something like the institutions of bourgeois liberal society, people will 
be less able to work out their private salvations, create their private self-images, 
reweave their webs of belief and desire in the light of whatever new people and books 
they happen to encounter […] 43 
 
IX. Hope and Imagination in Place of Reactionary Politics 
 
Hegel saw the nation as a creative Geist or spirit that was constantly refashioning itself.44 
Dewey saw it the same way, but viewed democracy as the best vehicle for reaching better 
political outcomes for individuals.45 Similarly, Rorty asked the cultural Left to think about 
changing the direction of the country through broad participation in a liberal democracy, 
unified by a national pride instead of identity politics of difference. I think Hegel and the 
American Pragmatists’ approach is the right one here. Real and lasting political change in 
Western societies requires a national will, not a menagerie of individual ones. A national will 
is an alloy of national pride and solidarity that, in turn, arises from local communities each 
with shared concerns for the socio-economic futures of their children and grandchildren. The 
importance of this contrast is central to this discussion; namely that the notion of ‘solidarity 
through national pride’ turns on the proposition of whether the individual wills of its citizens 
must be submitted to a national one. The answer must be in the affirmative. For democracy to 
function, there must be a necessary collective imagination of where the nation should be 
heading. If the autonomy of the individual is supreme and the needs of a nation are 
consistently secondary, polarisation and division quickly become the by-products. As St 
Thomas Aquinas argued in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics (Book 1, Comment 2): 
 
42 Slavoj Žižek, “Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism” New Left Review I/225 
28 (1997), 38: ‘The weak point of the universal multiculturalist gaze does not reside in its inability to “throw out 
the dirty water without losing the baby”: it is deeply wrong to assert that, when one throws out nationalist dirty 
water—“excessive” fanaticism—one should be careful not to lose the baby of “healthy” national identity, so that 
one should trace the line of separation between the proper degree of “healthy” nationalism which guarantees the 
necessary minimum of national identity, and “excessive” nationalism.’  
43 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 84-5.  
44 See e.g. Georg W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of History, (1857), 1.6 (John Sibree translation 1914).  
45 See e.g. John Dewey, “Democracy and Educational Administration,” School and Society 45 (April 3, 
1937); 457-67, 457. 
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‘Thus the political community seeks the supreme human good, since it aims at the common 
good, which is superior to, and more god-like than, the good of an individual.’ 
In participating in the greater good of a nation through democratic means, Catholics in 
Western democracies ought not react to economic or social change impulsively, as has been 
the case in many of the populist movements of the last few years. A more sustainable 
approach may be to imagine an imperfect utopia which, however flawed, could still be better 
than what one’s country is now. This utopia is not telic but rather an ongoing, collaborative 
project in which a nation continuously fashions its own social and political destiny, informed 
by its successes and chastened by its failures.46 The imagination of a future for one’s nation 
must translate to action and re-creation. Two quotes from Dewey are apt: ‘The self is not 
something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action’,47 
and: ‘Imagination is the chief instrument of the good’.48 When it comes to the nation state too, 
Dewey’s line of thinking is entirely consistent: ‘[I]n actual and concrete organisation and 
structure, there is no form of state which can be said to be the best; not at least till history is 
ended […] The formation of states must be an experimental process.’49 What breeds 
imagination is hope: a hope, pace Rorty, to reduce pain and cruelty for future generations. 
Hope can only exist where there is some solidarity between individuals and communities, 
where people of different creeds unite to remedy the plights within their own communities. It 
would lead to, what has been called, a ‘conservative internationalism’ that was once 
championed by Catholics in the early post-war period.50 Policies such as foreign aid, 
environmentalism, and pluralism fashioned in a society where its citizenry is striving for the 
same goals and hopes of reducing pain and humiliation, would have the potential to become 
much easier to address than they would in a society where its citizenry is politically and 
culturally divided against itself.  
 
X. Concluding Remarks 
 
Like the labour movements of the 1930s, it is the right time today for Catholics to encourage 
fellow citizens to come together and advocate those causes that can benefit their nations. 
Catholics around the world in the coming few years will be required to make difficult political 
decisions about their countries’ futures and these decisions will be made easier only through a 
national pride shared with their fellow compatriots, who, although all living under the ‘same 
sky’ do not all have the ‘same horizon’, to paraphrase Konrad Adenauer.51 Each nation has its 
own culture and imagination regarding what its future might look like for the next generation 
of citizens. A national pride in each country breeds a solidarity for a better society a century 
hence, which only then can provide a solid foundation for addressing global issues through 
cooperative foreign policy, shared international development goals, and mutually beneficial 
relationships. 
According to Rorty, this cannot be achieved solely within the ‘Academy’; that is, by 
contemplative debate among intellectuals in the universities, but rather must be done through 
majoritarian politics and concerted practical action within a pluralistic society, bolstered by 
collective efforts (such as labour movements or political programmes advocating systemic 
 
46 Cf. Hans Blumenberg’s notion of ‘self-assertion’ in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age trans. R. Wallace 
(Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983), Part Two. 
47 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: MacMillan and Co., 1916), 408.  
48 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), 348.  
49 John Dewey, The Later Works 1925-1953 (Illinois, 2008), 2.256.  
50 See Carsten Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003), 27. 
51 Konrad Adenauer. Quoted in Atlantic Community Quarterly 14-15 (1977): 200.    
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economic reform) with a shared imagination for what their country’s future might look like.52 
This project will not reach a point where action is no longer required or the goal is fulfilled, 
when Catholics can retreat from engaging in political action but instead, it will be a 
continuous collaboration handed down from one generation to another, reshaping itself into 
posterity. Yet improvement requires pride in one’s country, having enough invested in it to be 
willing to change it for the better. To have a civic system fragmented into competing racial, 
religious, sexual, and cultural identities may result in contradictory beliefs and goals that 
stymie a nation’s progress. Rather than identity or reactionary politics, Catholics might seek 
to promote a kind of solidarity through this national pride, based on hope and shared by 
individuals of all backgrounds, who dare to imagine a better future for their nation’s next 
generations in which suffering, cruelty, and humiliation are minimised. This ongoing and 
creative process might engender a national selfhood with concomitant political and social 
programmes. Such collaboration might also result in a lasting solidarity between communities 
that, if imagined and strived towards, could possess a genuine possibility of bridging the 
increasingly partisan divisions facing liberal democracies today. 
 
52 Cf. Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 99: ‘[The] Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and 
abusive names for ‘the system’ and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so 
can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academy – and, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside 
the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control 
of its destiny and make itself a better place.’  
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